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1The problem of emotional significance
1. Introduction: emotional fittingness and personal significance
Imagine that you are suddenly confronted by an angry bear: unsurprisingly, you
are afraid. Your fear, we might think, fits the situation: an angry bear is indeed a fitting
object of fear. But how should we understand this claim?1
It might be thought that this question is easy to answer. Emotions, it is
sometimes suggested, are associated with a core relational theme (Lazarus, 1991: 122).
Fear, for example is associated with danger; sorrow with loss; joy with success; anxiety
with the prospect of a setback. To say that an emotional response fits the situation, it
might be thought, is to say that the situation embodies the relevant theme. Your fear,
then, will fit the situation if the bear really is dangerous; sorrow will fit the situation if
one really has suffered as loss; and so on.2 This seems right, as far as it goes.3 Indeed, in
the case of fear, we might think that it is more or less sufficient. For other emotions,
however, specifying a core relational theme is only a first step in answering the
question. Sorrow, for example, is associated with loss. But not every loss is a proper
object of sorrow: the loss of a hair or a headache is not usually a sad loss. Sorrow is
concerned only with significant losses and harms. Similarly, anxiety is concerned with
the prospect of a significant setback; joy with a significant success; and so on. To
account for emotional fittingness, then, we need to explain what constitutes an
emotionally significant situation.
This is not a straightforward thing to do. For one thing, there are many types of
emotion: there is no reason to assume that they can be covered by a single account.
Moreover, there are many possible answers.4 The objective of this paper, however, is
not to survey the possibilities. Rather, I want to focus on a particular kind of account –
2one that has often been proposed, albeit in passing, by theorists of emotion.5 As I shall
explain, this kind of account can plausibly be applied only to a particular class of
emotional response. Hence, my discussion will be concerned only with responses of this
kind.
The suggestion that I propose to investigate is this:
P Emotional significance is personal significance: emotionally significant
situations are ones that bear on the subject’s interests or concerns.
I take it that P is a plausible claim – plausible enough to merit further investigation. It is
natural to think of emotions such as fear, anger, anxiety, sadness, joy, jealousy,
embarrassment and pride as concerned, in different ways, with the subject’s interests or
concerns. There are, however, two important provisos that need to be made.
First, P is not true of all emotional responses. Most obviously, perhaps, it is not
true of moral emotions, such as indignation and remorse.6 Suppose, for example, that Jo
is remorseful about something she has done. To know whether her remorse is fits the
situation, we need to know whether she was responsible for her action and whether it
was wrong. But we do not need to know how it bears on her interests or concerns. We
do not even need to know whether she believes or cares that her action was wrong: even
if her remorse is fleeting and out of character, it might fit the situation, given what she
has done. In the case of moral emotions, emotional significance appears to be moral,
rather than personal, significance.7
Secondly, one can fittingly feel anxious or sad for someone else, even when
their situation has no bearing on one’s own concerns (Tappolet, 2010). We should avoid
understanding P in a way that excludes this possibility. There are two ways in which we
might allow for it. First, we might understand ‘personal significance’ in a way that
allows one person’s concerns to have personal significance for someone else. Secondly,
3we might treat emotional responses of this kind as a distinct category, involving a
different kind of emotional significance. I shall not try to adjudicate this issue here.
Despite these provisos, I take it that P is plausibly true of an important class of
emotional responses: these might include joy at being alone, sorrow about a lost brooch,
anxiety about retirement. As it stands, however, P can interpreted more than one way.
One possibility is that personal significance depends on the subject’s preferences –
desires, values or likes. Another is that it depends on the subject’s interests, understood
as independent of their preferences.8 My aim here is to consider which of these
interpretations is most plausible.
The interpretation that I favour is a kind of preference-based account. It differs
from other preference-based accounts in that it that appeals to the subject’s likes, rather
than their desires or values. In Section 2, I shall set out this likes-based account. I shall
then contrast it with other possible interpretations of P. In Section 3, I shall consider
other kinds of preference-based account; and in Section 4, I shall discuss an interest-
based account. My aim is to establish that, of the accounts considered here, the likes-
based account provides the most plausible interpretation of P.
2. A likes-based account
2.1 Introducing likes and dislikes
My first task is to explain how I am using the terms ‘like’ and ‘dislike’. To like a
certain condition – as I shall use the term here – is to have a settled disposition to
experience it as pleasant or rewarding; to dislike something is to have a settled
disposition to experience it as unpleasant or distressing. My usage here is not intended
to reflect the full range of meanings that these terms can have in ordinary conversation:
I am using these terms in a much more restricted sense.
4Experiences of pleasure or distress are not all of a kind: they include bodily
sensations of pain, hunger and comfort; but they also include feelings of excitement,
boredom, satisfaction, frustration, relief, disappointment, loneliness, elation and misery.
What these feelings have in common is that they signal how things are going for the
subject in various ways (Millgram, 1993: 401): these might include the satisfaction of
basic biological needs, such as being warm and well-fed; as well as social and
psychological needs, such as autonomy, social interaction and intellectual stimulation.
Likes, in this sense, concern types of condition, rather than particular people or objects.
Nevertheless, a person may develop likes that are quite specific, and these may involve
particular objects: for example, a father might like having his own children around him.
Some likes, I take it, are inherited. These include likes for basic necessities, such
as warmth and food. We have them because, in the past, human beings who liked these
things did better than those who did not. However, this is not to say that everyone likes
these things in the same quantities or to the same degree: people differ in temperament;
and likes can change with age. Moreover, likes can be learned and even deliberately
cultivated: one can become sensitive to noise or accustomed to solitude; one can make
an effort to like skateboarding or jazz. A person’s likes, then, depend on their particular
history: evolutionary, cultural and personal.
Some likes and dislikes can be described as malformed. Consider static
mechanical allodynia – a condition in which the subject experiences light pressure as
painful. In this case, there is an obvious sense in which the subject’s aversion is
malformed: it is due to neural damage. Conceivably, likes can also be malformed
because they have been mislearned. Suppose that Kevin has a profound aversion to
crowds, sparked by a single incident when, as a child, he became briefly separated from
his mother. Arguably, Kevin’s enduring aversion is mislearned, in that it does not
5properly reflect his past experience: rather than being shaped by his experience as a
whole, it is an overreaction to a single incident in his childhood.
We can make sense of the idea that likes can be malformed only if we hold that
the processes by which we acquire them are governed by norms of some kind. There is
room for different views about the nature of these norms: which view we should adopt
will depend on our broader theories about the nature of the mind.9 Nothing that I shall
say here turns on this broader issue, however. What matters is just the claim that likes
can be malformed. This is important because, as I shall explain later, it might be thought
to raise a dilemma for the likes-based theorist.
My next task is to explore, very briefly, the relationships between likes, desires,
values and interests. The importance of the points made here will emerge later on, when
I contrast the likes-based account with its rivals.
2.2 Likes, desires and interests
Liking something is not the same as wanting or valuing it. Admittedly, a
subject’s desires and values are shaped by their likes. But someone can like a situation
without first having wanted it. Perhaps they never envisaged the situation before it
occurred; or perhaps they are mistaken about their likes. Conversely, a person may want
or value a situation that they do not like. Again, this might be due to a lack of self-
knowledge; but it may be because their desires reflect considerations – moral or
personal ideals, perhaps – that are independent of their likes.10
The relationship between likes and interests is more complex. It will depend, of
course, on what we take a person’s interests to be. We might identify a person’s
interests with the satisfaction of their preferences or with the happiness that results.
Here, however, I am casting the interest-based account as an alternative to preference-
based accounts: for my current purposes, then, I cannot define a person’s interests in
6terms of their preferences. Rather, I am going to assume something like an ‘objective
list’ theory of interests (Parfit, 1986: 499; Brink, 1989: 231-4). According to objective
list theories, there are certain goods that are required for a successful human life: these
might include health, autonomy, social interaction and intellectual stimulation. What is
in a person’s interests, then, is to possess goods of these kinds.
There are obvious connections between interests and likes. If certain goods are
required for a good life, these will be things that people would do well to like.
Moreover, it is reasonable to suppose that a plausible list of interests will be a list of
things that people characteristically do like. For our likes reflect, in part, our nature as
biological and social creatures of a certain kind; and it is reasonable to suppose that a
plausible list of objective goods will do so too.
Arguably, though, there is a more intimate relationship between interests and
likes. Earlier I suggested that the experiences of pleasure and pain that manifest our
likes can be seen as signalling the satisfaction or frustration of our biological or
psychological needs. If so, it is natural to suppose that our likes, too, will often reflect
our interests. More precisely, our likes will often reflect the particular ways in which we
are accustomed to satisfy our interests. These will vary, depending on our individual
traits and capacities and on the opportunities available to us: one person may satisfy
their social needs through amateur dramatics, another by watching sport with their
friends. Moreover, our likes do not simply reflect our interests: they also motivate us to
seek out situations and activities in which, experience suggests, we are able to satisfy
our interests. Without this motivation, opportunities may be left unexploited. Perhaps
bridge parties could provide me with all intellectual stimulation I need; but I will not
exploit this opportunity if I hate playing bridge.
7One corollary of this is that there is an important distinction between interests
and likes: a person’s likes will generally be far more specific than their interests. This is
because our interests, as I am conceiving them here, are concerned with goods that are
required for any good human life; while the likes of particular person will reflect their
particular circumstances and experience. Hence, while it may be true that everyone has
an interest in maintaining a good social life, how much and what kinds of social
interaction someone likes will vary from person to person.
Moreover, not all our likes are connected with our interests. A person may
harbour likes that are quite independent of their interests. These will include malformed
likes. But some well-formed likes fall into this category too. Consider, for example,
someone who loves parachuting. Conceivably, her hobby makes no contribution to her
social or intellectual life; it does not promote her autonomy or even her health. She
simply enjoys the sensation of falling to earth. There is no reason, I take it, to think that
this is a malformed like. Nevertheless, it reflects the subject’s tastes, rather than her
interests. (In what follows, I shall refer to likes of this kind as ‘idle likes’.)
Our likes, I have suggested, can be distinguished both from our values and
desires and from our interests. The relationship between our interests and our likes is
intimate, but also complex. Our likes, I have suggested, often concern situations and
activities which enable us to satisfy our interests; moreover, they motivate us to exploit
those opportunities. But this is not always the case: some well-formed likes are
independent of our interests.
2.3 The likes-based account
The likes-based account centres on the following claim:
L The personal significance of a situation is a matter of how it bears on one
or more of the subject’s likes or dislikes.
8Suppose that Linda is anxious about the prospect of retirement. On the likes-based
account, retirement would be a significant setback for Linda if it would leave her in a
condition – of social isolation, say – that she has a settled disposition to experience as
unpleasant or distressing. Conversely, avoiding retirement would be a significant
success if it would leave her in a situation that she has a settled disposition to
experience as rewarding.11
In some cases, an emotional response directly manifests a like or dislike:
Kevin’s panicky feelings in a crowd, for example, directly manifest his dislike of
crowds. In other cases, the relationship is less direct: Linda’s anxiety need not manifest
a dislike of retirement as such, but rather her dislike of some condition – social isolation
– that she expects to follow if she retires now. We might say that her anxiety accords
with her dislike. On the likes-based account, then, certain emotional responses fit the
situation only if they either manifest or accord with the subject’s likes and dislikes.
In applying this account, we should remember that emotional significance is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for fittingness. To judge whether an emotional
response fits the situation we also need to consider the core relational theme associated
with that type of response. Sorrow, for example, implies that the subject has suffered a
significant loss; anxiety implies that they face a significant setback; and so on. Indeed,
in some cases, the core relational theme associated with a particular type of emotional
response constrains which likes or dislikes might be at stake. Fear, for example, is
associated with physical danger: hence fear relates specifically to our basic biological
aversion to injury and death. This is why, in the case of fear, the question of emotional
fittingness is not particularly pressing: it is relatively obvious what fearful situations
have in common. In contrast, it is less obvious what worrying situations have in
common: a setback might relate to any of the subject’s likes, including likes shaped by
9their particular history. On this account, then, we cannot say that a situation is worrying
tout court: it is worrying for a particular person, depending on their history.12
To say that a situation has a certain personal significance for someone is not to
make a claim about their likes overall. Indeed, it seems possible to like something in
one way, but dislike it in another. Hence, the likes-based account allows scope for what
we might call ‘fitting ambivalence’. Suppose that a grandmother finds her
grandchildren’s company both charming and exhausting: hearing that they have
cancelled a visit, she feels both disappointed and relieved. Her emotions are ambivalent;
but each is fitting, on this account, because each accords with a like (or dislike) of hers.
2.4 Misplaced emotional responses
It might be objected that the likes-based account does not allow for misplaced
emotional responses.13 This is because, in many cases, liking a certain condition
involves having certain emotional dispositions – for example, a disposition to
experience a certain situation as uplifting or depressing. It might be thought, then, that
the account amounts to nothing more than the claim that an emotional response fits the
situation if the subject is disposed to have that emotion in that situation. If so, an
emotional response could never be misplaced: for the fact that the subject has that
emotion entails that they are disposed to have it in that situation.
I shall concede that, on the likes-based account, there are cases in which an
emotional response fits the situation simply because the subject has a (settled)
disposition to experience that emotion in that kind of situation. Suppose that a hiker is
standing by the side of a lonely mountain lake, rejoicing in his solitude. Suppose too,
that he really is alone; and that he really does love solitude.14 In this case, the likes-
based account does indeed imply that the hiker’s joy fits the situation; and that this is
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because this is just the sort of situation in which he has a (settled) disposition to rejoice.
In this kind of case, there is nothing more to say.
Even in this case, however, there is no guarantee that the hiker’s joy fits the
situation. First, he may not actually be alone: perhaps he has failed to notice the crowd
of boy scouts silently gathering behind him. If so, his joy is misplaced because the
situation fails to embody the appropriate core relational theme: he has not succeeded in
being alone. Secondly, his joy may not manifest a settled disposition: perhaps he is the
kind of person who cannot bear to be alone for five minutes, but has been briefly caught
up in a fantasy of himself as a self-reliant backwoodsman. If so, his joy is misplaced,
because it does not, after all, manifest a like. Similar possibilities arise in a case in
which an emotional response accords with, rather than directly manifests, the subject’s
likes: Linda’s anxiety will be misplaced if she is not, in fact, facing the prospect of
retirement; or if retirement will not affect her as she expects.
There are, then, at least two ways in which an emotional response might turn out
to be misplaced, on the likes-based account. As we, shall see in the next section, there is
room for a third, depending on how the likes-based theorist deals with cases involving
malformed likes.
2.5 Malformed likes
Earlier, I suggested that some likes can be described as malformed. What should
the likes-based theorist say about malformed likes?
Suppose that Mitch is a compulsive hoarder. Assume too that his love of
hoarding is malformed: it is the product of some psychological or physiological process
that has not occurred as it should.15 Suppose too that Mitch is devastated when relatives
clear out his collection of old newspapers. Does his sorrow fit the situation? Certainly,
he has suffered a loss; moreover, he has lost something that he cared deeply about.
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Nevertheless, there is surely some sense in which Mitch ought not to feel sad: his
sorrow accords with a like that (in one sense) he ought not to have.
There are two responses that a likes-based theorist might make in this case. First,
they might insist that Mitch’s sorrow fits the situation, insofar as it accords with his
likes. Someone who takes this line can still allow that, in most conversational contexts,
it would be misleading simply to assert that Mitch’s sorrow fits the situation. The
assertion would be misleading, not because it is false, but because it overlooks the more
pressing point that his sorrow reflects a love of hoarding that is itself malformed. There
is an important sense, then, in which Mitch ought not to feel sad. This is not because he
has misevaluated the personal significance of his loss; rather, it is because his loss ought
not to have the personal significance that it has. Alternatively, a likes-based theorist
might adopt what I shall call an ideal likes-based account. On this kind of account, the
personal significance of a situation is determined only by the subject’s well-formed likes
– likes that properly reflect the subject’s history. On this view, Mitch’s sorrow is
misplaced, because it does not accord with any of his well-formed likes.
There is room, then, for dispute between likes-based theorists about this kind of
case.16 Both accounts imply that Mitch ought not to feel sad, but they suggest different
ways of understanding this claim. As a result, it is difficult to resolve the issue by
appealing to what we might naturally say about this case.17 I am not going to try to
resolve the dispute here. Instead, I shall bear both versions of the account in mind in
what follows.
The likes-based theorist, then, holds that the personal significance of a situation
is a matter of how it bears on the subject’s likes and dislikes, where these are
understood as settled dispositions to experience a certain situation as either pleasant or
unpleasant. I have considered how the likes-based theorist might deal with emotional
12
responses arising from malformed likes; and I have explained how the account can
allow for misplaced emotional responses. My next task is to explain why we might
prefer this kind of account to other possible interpretations of P. In the next section I
shall contrast the likes-based account with two other preference-based accounts. I shall
begin by introducing these rival accounts.
3. Preference-based accounts
3.1 Varieties of preference-based account
The likes-based account has two important features. First, it focuses on a
particular type of preference – that is, the subject’s likes. Secondly, it is a relatively
undemanding account: according to the likes-based account, the personal significance of
a situation depends on how it bears on one or more of the subject’s likes, rather than
their likes overall. It is possible to envisage other preference-based accounts that share
these features. For example, we might envisage a desires-based account, on which the
personal significance of a situation is a matter of how it bears on one or more of the
subject’s desires or values.
In contrast, Bennett Helm (2001) has developed a preference-based account that
differs from the likes-based account in both these ways. Underlying Helm’s account is a
claim about evaluative rationality. According to Helm (2001, 60-98; 152-6), we are
under a rational obligation to ensure that all our preferences – evaluative judgments,
desires, emotional attitudes and likes – are mutually coherent, in the following sense:
someone who judges something to be valuable without desiring it, or who desires
something that they neither like nor value, is guilty of a kind of irrationality. On Helm’s
view, then, a fully rational person can be ascribed a single, overarching evaluative
perspective, determined by all their preferences taken together: an emotional response
will fit the situation only if it coheres with the subject’s evaluative perspective overall
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(Helm, 2001: 125-160; 153). On Helm’s account, then, the personal significance of a
situation does not depend on a particular type of preference, but on preferences of every
kind: likes, desires, values and emotional attitudes. Moreover, Helm takes personal
significance to be determined the subject’s preferences overall.
The two accounts under consideration, then, can be summarised as follows:
D The personal significance of a situation is a matter of how it bears on one
or more of the subject’s desires or values (The desires-based account).
H The personal significance of a situation is a matter of how it bears on the
subject’s evaluative perspective overall (Helm’s account).
Both these rival accounts imply that our desires and values help to determine personal
significance. This is the claim that I need to test in what follows. To do this, I shall
explore three scenarios in which the subject’s desires and values clash with their likes. I
shall argue that the likes-based account offers the most plausible way of characterising
these cases.
3.2 Scenarios 1 and 2
Linda believes that changes at her workplace may soon force her to retire.
Moreover, she wholeheartedly wants to retire and judges that it would be best for her to
do so. She believes that retirement would provide the freedom and tranquillity she needs
to thrive. In fact, as her friends know, Linda thrives on the ‘buzz’ that her working
environment provides. If her desire were satisfied, she would be miserable.
Scenario 1 When Linda’s manager suddenly summons her to a meeting, she is
gripped by anxiety: freedom and tranquillity suddenly strike her as terrifying.
Scenario 2 When Linda is told that she will not have to retire, she feels
disappointed.
14
In the first scenario, the likes-based account implies that Linda’s anxiety fits the
situation: since retirement would make her miserable, her anxiety reflects the personal
significance that the situation has for her. The desires-based account, in contrast,
implies that Linda’s emotional response is misplaced: for, given that she whole-
heartedly wants to retire, her anxiety accords with none of her desires. The result would
be different if Linda’s desires were ambivalent. As I have constructed the example,
however, Linda’s anxiety is at odds with all her desires.18 Hence these accounts produce
opposing verdicts in this case. In the second scenario, the verdicts are reversed. Since
Linda would take no pleasure in retirement, the likes-based account implies that her
disappointment is misplaced. The desires-based account, in contrast, implies that her
disappointment fits the situation, because she has failed to get something that she wants.
What should Helm say about these cases? For Helm, the personal significance
that the situation has for Linda depends on her evaluative perspective overall. One
question, then, is whether Linda can be ascribed a single evaluative perspective on the
situation. According to Helm, this depends on how far her judgment is supported by her
other preferences (Helm, 2001: 150). Suppose, first, that Linda’s preferences are
sufficiently coherent to constitute a single evaluative perspective in favour of
retirement. If so, Helm should concur with the desires-based theorist: Linda’s
disappointment fits the situation, while her anxiety is misplaced. Alternatively, it may
be impossible to ascribe a single evaluative perspective to Linda (Helm, 2001: 134-
142). If so, there is no clear standard against which her emotional responses can be
judged: they are neither fitting nor misplaced.19
I would like to suggest that, of these three accounts, the likes-based account
gives the most plausible set of verdicts in these cases. In the first scenario, Linda’s
anxiety comes as a surprise to her. Plausibly, though, her later unhappiness shows that
15
she did, indeed, have something to be anxious about, even if her feelings were hard to
understand at the time. Again, in the second scenario, we can easily imagine Linda’s
friends telling her that she has nothing to be disappointed about, and that she should feel
relief at her manager’s decision; for retirement, they know, would only make her
miserable.20 As we have seen, the desires-based account gives precisely the opposite
verdicts in these cases. Helm’s account raises a third possibility: that in these first two
scenarios, Linda’s emotional responses are neither fitting nor misplaced. On the face of
it, though, it seems clear what we should say.
3.3 Scenario 3
Consider, now, a third possibility.
Scenario 3 Linda judges that that it would be best to retire. She makes this
judgment, knowing that retirement will make her miserable, believing that her
ideals require her to live in a more challenging and precarious way. When her
manager summons her to a meeting, she is gripped by anxiety. After retirement,
she finds that her new life fulfils her ideals, even though, as expected, she does
not enjoy it.
Once again, the likes-based account implies that Linda’s anxiety fits the situation: for
she will not enjoy her retirement. In this case, the desires-based theorist might well
agree: for in this scenario, Linda is aware that retirement will make her miserable; as a
result, it seems likely that her desires are ambivalent. Suppose then that Linda continues
to harbour a desire to go on working, despite her ideals. If so, her anxiety will reflect
this recalcitrant desire. Both these accounts, then, allow that Linda’s anxiety fits the
situation, while allowing that her judgment might also be correct. These accounts permit
this kind of ambivalence because they assume that Linda’s anxiety reflects a narrower
range of considerations than her judgment. As a result, her emotional response and her
16
judgment do not directly contradict each other. They clash, rather, in motivating
different kinds of practical response: Linda’s judgment implies that she should welcome
retirement; her anxiety impels her to resist it.
What might Helm say about this third scenario? In this case, it seems likely that
Linda’s judgment represents her evaluative perspective overall. For it reflects the broad
set of values to which she is committed; moreover, she has not overlooked her likes, but
has chosen to set them aside. If so, Helm should conclude that Linda’s anxiety is
misplaced – contradicting the likes-based account.
The third scenario is more complex than the first two. On the one hand, Linda
believes, rightly, that retirement will be disruptive and unpleasant. On the other hand,
she clear-sightedly wants to retire; indeed, she values retirement precisely because of
the disruption it will cause. It might be suggested, then, that Linda’s commitment to her
ideals alters the personal significance of the situation: retirement will be a significant
success for Linda because it will give her what she values overall, just as Helm’s
account implies. I would suggest, though, that this does not quite ring true. For no
matter how much Linda wants to retire, no matter how well-considered her judgment,
the fact remains that retirement will be a painful and disorientating experience.
Plausibly, she has good grounds to baulk at it.
Linda’s situation might be compared to others with a similar structure. Suppose
that a woman who loves to keep busy is told by her doctor that she needs to slow down;
she accepts this, and wants to follow her doctor’s advice; yet she finds the prospect
depressing. Or suppose that a father’s much-loved daughter is leaving home; he wants
her to have an independent life; he judges, too, that this would be best for both of them
overall; yet, he is sad that she will no longer need him. In these cases, too, the subjects’
17
emotions baulk precisely at what they want and judge best overall. Yet, on the face of it,
they do have something to be sad about – as the likes-based theorist suggests.
What, though, of Helm’s claim that we are rationally obliged to ensure that our
preferences are mutually coherent? Given that Linda is aware of the clash between her
emotional response and her other preferences, is her anxiety not irrational? It is
important to note that this claim is very controversial. It is far from clear why people
should be under any general obligation to ensure that their preferences are coherent
overall.21 In the case of beliefs, it is possible to explain why knowingly harbouring
inconsistent beliefs is irrational: our beliefs reflect an independent reality which is itself
assumed to be consistent; hence, if one belief contradicts another, at least one must be
false. A value realist might hold that this is true of values, too; but Helm, I take it, is not
committed to value realism. It might be suggested, perhaps, that evaluative coherence is
required for effective agency: evaluative ambivalence makes it impossible to decide
what to do. But this seems false: characteristically, our practical decisions are shaped by
a host of considerations: ambivalence over one is unlikely to lead to paralysis. Indeed, it
has been argued that maintaining a degree of ambivalence is beneficial because it allows
for some flexibility and creativity in an uncertain world (Greenspan, 1980; Rorty,
2010). Of course, these brief remarks are not enough to establish that Helm is wrong
about this. Nevertheless, the case for evaluative coherence does not itself appear to be
so strong that it compels us to re-evaluate this case.22
Nevertheless, there is another, more modest objection that might be pressed
against the likes-based account. Whatever her grounds for anxiety, Linda surely has a
reason to overcome her feelings in this particular case. This might be true, regardless of
whether there is any general requirement to maintain evaluative coherence. If so, it
might be taken to show that her desires and values help to determine the personal
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significance of the situation after all. For what other reason could she have to bring her
feelings into line? Now, I accept that Linda has a reason to overcome her anxiety. I
would argue, though, that this is not because her anxiety is misplaced. For Linda has
another reason to conquer her feelings: her anxiety motivates her to resist retirement.
Hence her anxiety constitutes a practical obstacle to the pursuit of her ideals.
This leaves a problem, however: if Linda’s anxiety fits the situation, how can
she reasonably try to overcome it? Would this not require a kind of self-deception – of
the kind someone might employ to eradicate a true but inconvenient belief? The
problem dissolves, however, once we consider what practical steps Linda might take to
deal with her anxiety. In the short term, perhaps, she might remind herself that she
wants to retire; but we need not assume that she is thereby re-evaluating the personal
significance of the situation. Rather, she may be reminding herself that there are other
things at stake. In the longer term, she might prepare herself for the change by learning
to enjoy different kinds of activity and by forging new friendships and commitments. In
doing this, she is not re-evaluating the personal significance of the situation. Rather, she
is trying to change it – by changing her likes. 23
I have considered three scenarios in which the subject’s desires and values clash
with their likes. I have suggested that the first two scenarios give clear support to the
likes-based account and that the likes-based account offers a plausible verdict in the
third scenario. Moreover, the account offers a credible explanation of why and how
Linda might try to overcome her anxiety. I would conclude that there are good reasons
to prefer a likes-based account to the rival preference-based accounts considered here. If
this is right, it suggests that the emotional responses such as sorrow and anxiety answer
to the subject’s likes, and not their desires or values.
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There remains, however, a further possibility. It might be suggested that Linda’s
anxiety fits the situation, not because retirement will leave her in a situation that she
dislikes, but because it will damage one or more of her interests, where these are
understood as independent of the subject’s preferences. It is possible, then, that personal
significance is determined, not by the subject’s preferences, but by their interests. It is
now time to consider this suggestion.
4. An interest-based account
4.1 The appeal to interests
Earlier, I suggested that we should identify a person’s interests with their
possession of certain goods – health, prosperity, autonomy, social interaction,
intellection stimulation, and so on – conceived as goods required for a good human life.
On an interest-based account, then, a situation will have positive personal significance
for the subject insofar as it allows the subject to secure one or more of these goods; it
will have negative personal significance insofar as it deprives the subject of a good of
this kind. This will be true, regardless of whether the subject likes, desires or values
these things.
Consider, for example, the case of Linda. Retirement, I suggested, will restrict
Linda’s social life. In doing this, we might think, it deprives her of an important good,
so damaging her interests. It looks then, as if the interest-based theorist should agree
with the likes-based theorist that Linda has cause to be anxious about retirement.
Nevertheless, the two theorists will describe this case in different ways. For the interest-
based theorist, what matters is that retirement will deprive Linda of something valuable,
regardless of whether she finds the loss distressing. Exactly the same point applies in
the case of Mitch, who is sad to lose his collection of old newspapers. For the interest-
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based theorist, Mitch’s sorrow will fit the situation only if the loss of his collection will
damage one or more of his interests.
So far there seems to be little to choose between the two accounts. In what
follows, however, I shall argue that the interest-based theory faces three difficulties: the
specificity problem; the problem of idle likes; and the problem of motivation. As we
shall see, all these problems stem from the complex and intimate relationship between
interests and likes explored in Section 2.
4.2 The specificity problem
Earlier, I suggested that we should expect a person’s likes to be more specific
than their interests. This is because interests are common to all human beings, while a
person’s likes reflect the particular ways in which they are disposed to satisfy their
interests. A person’s likes, then, will normally reflect their particular circumstances,
traits and capacities. This contrast between interests and likes raises a difficulty for the
interest-based theorist.
Consider, once again, the case of Linda. Linda’s social life, I suggested, will be
curtailed when she retires. So far, I have assumed that this will damage her interests. In
fact, this was too quick: it is possible, after all, that Linda’s social life is currently too
active, and that it would be in her interests to socialise less. What matters, as far as her
interests are concerned, is not whether she will have less social interaction, but whether
she will have less than she needs. The challenge for the interest-based theorist, then, is
to explain what this means – and to do so without appealing to Linda’s desires or likes.
For some goods, perhaps, there is a common standard to which we can appeal:
perhaps medical science can define what constitutes good health for someone of Linda’s
gender and age. But there seems to be no common measure that determines how much
social interaction or intellectual stimulation people should have: this is a matter on
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which individuals vary. But perhaps it might be suggested that there at least some
minimum amount of social interaction needed to live a good life, and that Linda’s
interests will suffer if she drops below this minimum standard. On this view, Linda
would be entitled to feel anxious about retirement only if retirement would push her
below this standard. But this seems implausibly harsh: it implies that Linda has cause to
care only about meeting this minimum standard, even if it falls well short of satisfying
her preferences. If retirement will leave her lonely and bored, this is surely sufficient to
warrant her anxiety.
More plausibly, it might be suggested that it is in Linda’s interests to have as
much social interaction as possible, provided that she does not have too much. She has
too much, perhaps, if her social activities are seriously damaging her other interests. So
long as she is not in this position, it might be thought, any diminution in her social life
will leave her worse off; hence she is entitled to feel anxious at the prospect.
It is worth noting that this solution implies a rather different interpretation of the
objective list account. It implies that we should understand the account, not just as a
claim about what is required for a good life, but as a claim about what constitutes the
best possible life. The suggestion is that, up to a certain point, the more of these goods
one has, the better one’s life will be; conversely, the less one has, the worse one’s life
will be. This is a much stronger claim.
Moreover, it is not obviously true. Suppose that, prior to retirement, Linda
enjoys a rich social life – though not so rich that it damages her other interests. Linda’s
brother, Lee, also has an active social life, but one that is quieter than Linda’s. He fills
his spare time tending his garden or fixing an old boat – activities that he enjoys, but
which do not promote his interests. Linda and Lee find their lives equally satisfying;
indeed Lee would not welcome a fuller social life. Nevertheless, on the view under
22
consideration, Lee is worse off than Linda: it would be in his interests to socialise more.
It is far from clear, though, that this is true. Given that Lee not only has plenty of social
contact but also as much as he would like, it is not clear how he would benefit from
having more. But if this is right, it is not clear why (her preferences aside) Linda would
be worse off if her social life were more like Lee’s.
I am suggesting, then, that the interest-based account is unable to determine
whether retirement would constitute a personally significant loss for Linda. The
problem arises because the conception of interests underpinning the account is
concerned only with what kinds of goods are needed for a good human life: it does not
determine how much of these goods any individual should have. As a result, the
interest-based account does not determine at what point a diminution in her social life
would damage Linda’s interests. The problem would be easily solved if we could appeal
to people’s likes: Linda’s interests, we might think, will be damaged if she has less
social interaction than she would like; while Lee will not benefit from having more than
he would enjoy. To take this line, however, would be to give up the attempt to account
for personal significance without appealing to the subject’s preferences.24
4.3 The problem of idle likes
In Section 2, I suggested that people can have idle likes – that is, well-formed
likes that are independent of their interests. I gave the example of an enthusiastic
parachutist, whose hobby does nothing to satisfy her interests. Suppose, now, that this
enthusiastic parachutist has been advised that her hobby is damaging her health, and she
must give it up. She is frustrated and sad. On the likes-based account, her sorrow fits the
situation: she has lost something that she loves. In contrast, the interest-based account
implies that her sorrow is misplaced: giving up parachuting damages none of her
interests; rather, it promotes them.
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Once again, though, this seems unduly harsh. Plausibly, the subject’s loss is a
fitting object of sorrow, even if it is unequivocally in her interests to abandon her
hobby. The situation is similar to the case of the woman who is depressed by the
thought of giving up her active lifestyle, or the father who is sad at the thought that his
daughter no longer needs him. In those cases, the subjects’ emotions baulked at what
they judged best; in this case, the subject’s emotions baulk at what is actually in her
interests. Yet all these subjects have something to be sad about: the loss of something
they care for.
The interest-based theorist might object that I have misdescribed this case. Our
lives, they might claim, are enriched by doing things we enjoy: to live a good life, we
need to be able to satisfy some of our well-formed likes. Hence, giving up parachuting
will damage the subject’s interests, after all.25 If we take this line, however, it will
become much harder to distinguish the interest-based account from the likes-based
account. For the interest-based theorist will hold that, in nearly every case, the subject’s
interests and likes coincide. I have already suggested that if something is in someone’s
interests, we can normally expect them to like it, at least to some degree. But now it
turns out that the implication also runs in the other direction: if there is something that
someone likes, it will be in their interests to have it. The interest-based account will all
but collapse into the likes-based account.
4.4 The problem of motivation
The collapse, however, is not quite complete. It remains possible to find a kind
of case in which the two accounts continue to diverge: this a case in which the subject
has no liking at all for something that it would be in their interests to have. It is not
altogether easy to manufacture this kind of case. Someone who is healthy to a degree
that impacts upon their interests can surely be expected to have pleasant experiences as
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a result, at least in the long term. Hence, situations that bear upon the subject’s health
will also bear upon their likes. Autonomy is a harder case, if only because it is unclear
what it involves. But it is hard to imagine someone acting autonomously on a desire
without caring about it – that is, being disposed to feel some degree of satisfaction when
it is fulfilled or frustration when it is thwarted – even if their feelings overall are
ambivalent. If so, situations that bear on the subject’s autonomy will also inevitably
bear upon their likes.
However, in the case of goods such as social interaction or intellectual
stimulation, we can imagine the subject’s well-formed likes diverging from their
interests. For example, consider the following case:
Neil is a recluse, who takes no pleasure in social contact. He has learned that a
birthday party, organised in his honour by his relatives, has been cancelled. If
the event had gone ahead, he would not have enjoyed it; nor would it have
helped him to enjoy similar events in the future. Yet – sentimentally, perhaps –
he feels sad about the cancellation.
The interest-based theorist will hold that the Neil’s sorrow fits the situation: whatever
his preferences, it is in his interests to have some social contact. The likes-based theory
in contrast, implies that his sorrow is misplaced: Neil has no cause to feel sad about
missing an event that he would not have enjoyed. Of course, the likes-based theorist can
allow that there is a sense in which Neil ought to be sad about the cancellation: it would
be in his interests to care about events of this kind; still, no matter how regrettable his
feelings may be, his sorrow does not reflect the personal significance that the situation
has for him. This dispute, then, is similar to the dispute between the two likes-based
theorists over the case of Mitch. Both theorists can agree that there is some sense in
which Neil should feel sad: but they will disagree about how to understand this claim.
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In this case, though, there is a reason to prefer the verdict offered by the likes-
based account. In Section 2, I suggested that people’s likes not only often reflect the
different ways they have found to satisfy their interests; they also enable them to exploit
those opportunities, by motivating them to seek out situations and engage in activities
that benefit them. In this case, however, Neil has no motivation to exploit the
possibilities for social contact that the party would have offered: the social contact on
offer would have been endured, rather than pleasurably pursued. Under these
circumstances, it is hard to see how he would have benefited from the event.26 To say
that it is in Neil’s interests to have some social contact surely implies more than that he
should sometimes converse with other people; it implies that he should engage with
them in ways that he finds enjoyable and worthwhile. A similar point can be made
about cases involving intellectually stimulating activities.
Of course, it is open to the interest-based theorist to take account of this point:
they might allow that satisfying one’s interests sometimes depends on having the
capacity to enjoy certain kinds of situation or activity. If they make this move, though,
the interest-based theory really will collapse into the likes-based account. For not only
will it turn out that satisfying one’s (well-formed) likes constitutes a way of satisfying
one’s interests, it will also turn out that satisfying one’s interests will always imply
satisfying one’s likes.
I have argued that the most plausible version of the interest-based account is, in
effect, identical to the likes-based account. The reasons for this can be traced back to the
complex and intimate relationship between interests and likes. Moreover, in Section 3, I
argued that there are good reasons to prefer the likes-based theory to preference-based
accounts that appeal to the subject’s desires or values. If this is right, the conclusion to
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draw is that, of these accounts, it is the likes-based theory that provides the most
plausible interpretation of P.
5. Summary
I began by suggesting that, for some emotional responses, it is plausible to suppose that
emotional significance is a kind of personal significance. There are several ways in
which this claim might be understood: I have argued that there are good reasons to take
the view that personal significance is determined largely, and perhaps wholly, by the
subject’s likes. If this is correct, it suggests a certain picture of the role of emotion in
our practical lives. On this account, our emotions constitute a mode of evaluation that is
independent of our desires and values, and which is only indirectly responsive to reason.
Yet it also implies that our emotional susceptibilities are not simply imposed upon us
from outside: they reflect our history as individuals, and answer to our most
fundamental concerns.
Notes
1 Fittingness, I shall assume, is one of many standards we might use to assess your
response. In particular, to say that fear fits the situation is not to say that it is beneficial
or morally commendable: it might sometimes be useful or admirable to be unafraid,
even if the situation warrants fear (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000).
2 There are several ways in which this suggestion might be developed. A tempting
possibility is Jesse Prinz’s (2004: 64-7) suggestion that the core relational theme helps
to constitute the representational content of the emotional evaluation.
3 See Mulligan (2010) for a more sceptical view.
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4 We might adopt a robust subjectivism, on which emotional significance is in the eye
of the beholder; or we might adopt some kind of non-reductive value realism (Mulligan,
2010); there are many other possibilities besides.
5 See, for example, Arnold (1960:171); Lyons (1980: 35); Solomon (1993:128-9); Ben
Ze-ev (2000: 18-23); Nussbaum (2001: 30-33); Roberts (2003: 141-8); Prinz (2004: 63).
6 Intellectual and aesthetic emotions are likely exceptions too.
7 The line between personal and moral responses is not clear-cut. If Jo is ashamed of her
action, her response might involve a mix of personal and moral shame; and these
feelings may be hard to disentangle. In anger, the personal and the moral are even more
closely intertwined. I am not assuming, though, that it is always easy to make this
distinction. I am assuming only that there are some cases that are clearly non-moral
cases. These are the cases that I am trying to account for here.
8 For examples of these different approaches, see Aaron Ben Ze’ev (2000: 18) and
Martha Nussbaum (2001: 30-33).
9 My own view is that these norms are at root biological and historical norms. The idea
will be that the processes by which we acquire likes and dislikes is controlled by
developmental and psychological mechanisms of some kind; historically, these
mechanisms have functioned to ensure that our likes and dislikes develop in a way that
(very roughly) promotes our capacity to survive and produce healthy offspring, and they
have done this in a particular way. In Kevin’s case, perhaps, these mechanisms have not
operated as they (historically) should. This notion of a historical norm derives from
Millikan (1983: 33-34); see also [Author (2001: 48-49).] However, there are other ways
in which a likes-based theorist might understand the relevant norms.
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10 Admittedly, people tend to dislike having their desires frustrated. But to say that
people like to satisfy their desires does not imply that their desires are necessarily for
things that they like.
11 The likes-based account might be compared to claims that Elijah Millgram (1993)
and Robert Audi have made about desire (2001: 86-88). Millgram and Audi both argue
that certain kinds of desire are both rooted in and justified by experiences of pleasure or
distress. The likes-based account makes a similar claim about certain kinds of emotional
response.
12 de Sousa (2002: 255-56) appeals to the evolutionary, social and personal history of
our emotional capacities to define a notion of semantic success for an emotional
response. However, he makes no appeal to likes in his account. Compare also Baier
(1990), who emphasises the historical character of emotional fittingness.
13 I am using the term ‘misplaced’ to refer simply to emotional responses that fail to fit
the situation.
14 In what follows, I shall assume that the hiker loves being alone, not merely feeling as
if he is alone. The difference, I take it, lies in how he is disposed to respond were he to
discover that he is not, in fact, alone.
15 As I mentioned earlier, this presupposes the existence of norms that governing the
processes by which likes and dislikes are acquired. To say that Mitch’s love of hoarding
has not been acquired as it should does not preclude other ways of evaluating his
situation: for example, it might turn out that Mitch benefits from his love of hoarding.
16 A likes-based theorist might take different views about different cases. It might be
suggested, for example, that where an emotional response directly manifests a
malformed like, the emotional response is itself at fault; but where an emotional
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response accords with a malformed likes (as in Mitch’s case), it is the subject’s like, and
not the emotional response, that has gone wrong. Indeed, this seems to me to be a
natural thing to say; but I shall not press this suggestion here.
17 Perhaps it is simply unclear what we would say. Still, this leaves room for a debate
about what we should say. To decide that, though, we would need to appeal to
theoretical and empirical considerations that go beyond the scope of this paper.
18 It is tempting, perhaps, to suppose that Linda’s anxiety is due to some unconscious
desire to continue working. I am supposing, though, that this is not the case. Perhaps her
anxiety stems from an unconscious appreciation of her likes, or perhaps it is simply an
aberration.
19 In this case, Linda’s anxiety may signal that she should reconsider her judgment
(Helm, 2001: 146-147). However, this does not imply that her feelings fit the situation,
on Helm’s account. This is because we cannot say how she should resolve the conflict:
she might adjust her judgment to fit her likes or her likes to fit her judgment.
20 Admittedly, Linda might have cause to feel frustrated that her desires have been
thwarted.
21 See Marino (2010) for a sustained discussion.
22 To be fair, Helm does not present this claim as obviously true, but as an element
within a broader theory of value. But if I am right about the cases described here, this
theory leaves some of our intuitions about emotional fittingness unexplained.
23 To do this, Linda does not need to modify her most fundamental likes: perhaps she
will continue to take just as much pleasure in social interaction, while learning to like
new kinds of social activity. Rather, modifying her fundamental likes (for example, by
learning to enjoy a quieter life) would constitute a more radical way of changing the
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personal significance of the situation. This would, perhaps, be hard to do, though it does
not strike me as impossible.
24 There is, perhaps, scope to develop a hybrid account. In other words, we might take
the view that personal significance is determined by a person’s interests, but that it is
their likes that determine how much of these goods they need – within certain
parameters. This looks like a promising way of resolving the problem. Still, concedes
that the subject’s likes play a crucial role in determining personal significance.
Moreover, the hybrid account does not escape my remaining objection to the interest-
based account.
25An interest-based theorist who took this line might deny that Lee is worse off than
Linda: for while Linda socialises more, Lee has more time for hobbies. Still, this
theorist must insist that it is in Lee’s interests to extend his social life as far as he can
without detracting from his hobbies, regardless of his preferences.
26 Indeed, it may be this thought that makes it hard to accept that Lee should socialise
more, despite the fact that he would not enjoy it.
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